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Abstract—Timing attacks have caused an unprecedented 
evolution in the present cryptographic era where more and more 
cryptographic applications are running on embedded systems in 
a wireless environment. Paul Kocher, a well-known cryptanalyst 
was the first to successfully implement a timing attack on a 
cryptosystem. Subsequently many other timing attacks have 
been recorded while cryptographers tirelessly work on making 
the schemes more resistant to these and other side channel 
attacks. In this work, we examine timing information leaked 
from the computation of 𝒈𝒂 (𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝒑)  and observe the timing 
variations of modular exponential computations by varying the 
key length as well as the operating frequency of our 
experimental Raspberry Pi board. We have chosen to compute 
the algebraic expression on a U-Boot Bare Metal platforms our 
platform and use the GMP bignum library to compute the 
numbers which are greater than 64 bit.  We believe that the 
timing variations and patterns can lead to the early extraction 
of secret information in systems based on modular 
exponentiation. From our observations, there is a strong 
correlation of timing patterns when computing keys of the same 
length while the operating frequency used in the computation 
only affects the computational delay. 
 
Index Terms—Side Channel Attack; Cryptographic; Timing 
Attack; Modular Exponentiation; Raspberry Pi; Embedded 




Exhaustive key search attack [1] such as Brute Force can be 
an efficient tool for a finite key space and simple random key 
search also might be efficient. These kind of methods will no 
longer acceptable if the key space increases. 20 years ago, 
Paul Kocher implemented the first timing attack [2]. Timing 
attack is a side channel attack first presented by Paul Kocher 
whose work has become a major reference for timing and 
power analysis attacks. Side channel attack or side channel 
analysis is an attack on the implementation of a cryptosystem 
commonly dealing with the leakage of privacy data through 
side channel information [3]. In timing analysis based attack, 
timing channel can leak data or keys across a hardware 
implementation. An attacker will attack the cryptosystem by 
analyzing the time taken to execute the cryptographic 
algorithm. To solve the mathematical problems that 
embedded in the cryptosystem is very difficult [4]. So, the 
attack only focuses on the hardware or software that executes 
the schemes. Cryptanalysts or attackers only analyzed 
information that might lead to secret key disclosure or data 
compromise. 
The author had implemented timing attacks on several 
cryptosystems based on their modular exponential [5] (e.g. 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, RSA and El-Gamal). In this 
research we will implement timing attack on Diffie-Hellman 
Key Exchange (DHKE). The meaning of DHKE will be 
explained in section below. This paper will present how the 
initial data been collected in order to implement this timing 
attack. Based on our previous work [6], we decided to use U-
Boot [7] bare metal in ARM based embedded devices to do 
this experiment. 
 
A. Difiie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE)  
DHKE [8] is used for exchanging cryptographic keys in 
unsecure network communication. The earliest idea about 
public key infrastructure is to do encryption and decryption 
algorithms using different keys. The DHKE method allows 
two entities that have no prior knowledge of each other to 
jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure 
communications channel based on discrete log hard problems 
(DLP) as cryptographic strength [9][10]. The section below, 
we present how the DHKE protocol occur between two 
parties. 
Let p be a prime and g be a generator of the multiplicative 
group 
pz common for all participants [11]. Each party; Along 
and Busu, chooses randomly a secret number such as, a and 
compute the public parameter  modaA g p . A is made 
public. The public numbers are sufficient to establish a secret 
and common key for each pair of participants. Let us assume 
that Along has secret a  and has computed: 
 
 modaA g p  (1) 
 
and similarly Busu has secret 𝑏 and computed: 
 
 modbB g p  (2) 
 
Along then sends 𝑔𝑎 to Busu and Busu sends 𝑔𝑏 to Along. 
The shared secret key is 𝐾 = 𝑔𝑎𝑏. Along knowing 𝑎 and 𝑔𝑏, 
can easily calculated 𝑔𝑎𝑏 . Busu can determine the secret in 
similar manner by computing 𝑔𝑏𝑎. Thus the both parties 
obtain: 
  
 modabK g p  (3) 
 
They can use as a common secret key. For passive 
eavesdropper to determine this key, he must find key 
satisfying the (3) with suitable 𝑎 and 𝑏 satisfying (1) and (2) 
where the gathered data is just:  
 
 , , ,p g A B  (4) 
 
This problem called Diffie-Hellman Problem. An obvious 
way to solve it is to solve the Discrete Log Problem. With 
input  (𝑝, 𝑔, 𝐴) and then use the value of 𝑎 to compute K by:   
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The critical question is can 𝐾 be found without obtaining 
much information about 𝑎 𝑜𝑟 𝑏 in the process. In 
[8][11][12]the authors stated that solving 𝑎 𝑜𝑟 𝑏 is basically 
the only way to solve the Diffie-Hellman Problem. More 
precisely they assume that the Diffie-Hellman Problem is 
hard if the Discrete Log Problem is hard.  
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
In this section, we review several related methods in 
implementing the timing attack effectively. Kocher (1996) 
[2] had implemented the timing attack on modular 
exponentiations and was able to break the cryptosystem. 
Dhem et al. (2000) [3] proposed several improvements based 
on Kocher’s idea and was  able to break a 512-bit key in a 
few hours. The authors state that the most of the smart cards 
did not change their design to prevent timing attack against 
them. Schindler (2000) [13] presented a new technique of 
timing attack. Using very limited knowledge, the author was 
able to obtain a secret key from an RSA with the Montgomery 
multiplication. However, he did not mention the tools that 
were used to attack the cryptosystem. Song et al. (2001) [14] 
had devised a timing attack to gain information from SSH. 
The weakness from the SSH enable attackers to gain secret 
information from the server. The authors also explained the 
method to prevent such attacks.   
Hamza (2004) [15] had developed an attack based on 
genetic algorithm to attack the RSA cryptosystem. Based on 
the authors, this attack will not succeed if the cryptosystem 
used blinding technique and Montgomery algorithm. 
Brumley et al. (2005) [4]  show that timing attacks from an 
OpenSSL-based web server over a local network can reveal 
RSA private keys. They modified the Kocher’s attack [2] and 
successfully demonstrated that the attack can be conducted 
remotely against the server which is  running OpenSSL. 
Bernstein (2005) [16] performed a timing attack to recover 
the AES key from the OpenSSL  network server from another 
computer. The author claimed that the implementation of 
AES to write constant-time high-speed for common general-
purpose CPU is extremely difficult and this made the attack 
successful. Maired et al. (2005) [17] explained the method 
used by Bernstein to attack the AES using timing attack. The 
authors had stated that Bernstein’s attack can be prevented by 
several methods. 
Scott et al. (2009) [18] had proposed a remote timing attack 
by analyzing jitter and network response time over internet 
and local network. The authors mentioned that by filtering the 
jitter; they can reduce the time measurement to get the critical 
information from the server. Strenzke (2010) [19] performed 
how timing attack can used to steal information from 
browser. We will use these case studies of timing attack to 
further our research in implementation of timing attack. 
 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
 
We wish to eventually propose a method to reduce the time 
to search the private key (𝑎 𝑜𝑟 𝑏) in the DHKE. Instead of 
using the brute force method, we will use timing attack as our 
method [6]. Timing information that leaked from the 
computation of the 𝑔𝑎  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) will be used to extract the 
secret key or secret information unlike the man-in-the-middle 
attack which needs to know the values of 𝑎, 𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔. 
Therefore, we need to record the computational time, 𝑡𝑎 
which compute the value of (𝑔𝑎 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝).   
All the values of 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏 must be within the same bit 
size as the key length (e.g. 2048 bit) used. Assume that the 
most significant bit (MSB) for the minimum value of the key 
length is one (1) for the private key to be secure. Therefore, 
we need to find the lower and upper bound for the key length 
to limit the search for the value of 𝑎. To summarize this 
method, we state below the information that an attacker needs 
in order to launch the timing attack and the information the 
attacker wishes to uncover in the finality of the attack: 
 
  Attacker’s knowledge: 𝐴, 𝑔, 𝑝, 𝑡𝑎 




This section present the sequence of activities performed 
towards the completion of this experiment. For the 
experiments,  two key lengths will be used, namely 1024 bits 
and 2048 bits and computation will be conducted on the 
Raspberry Pi board at two different frequencies, which are 
700 MHz and 100MHz. Firstly, some random numbers  
𝑝, 𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎 are generated to produce keys of  length 1024 bit 
and 2048 bit. The values of 𝑝, 𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎 must be primes of the 
multiplicative group 𝑧𝑃 respectively [11]. For each 
experiment of different key length, the value for 𝑝 is the 
largest prime number of 1024 bit and 2048 bit depending on 
the key length in use. Meanwhile the value of 𝑔 is the second 
largest prime number in the key length bit size. As for the 
secret value 𝑎, the random value must be in the range of the 
lower bound and the upper bound based on the key length. 
The source code must be compiled into U-Boot Bare Metal 
by using the ARM toolchain. Debian 7 is the operating system 
that been used to compile the U-Boot by using the ARM tool 
chain on the Raspberry Pi device. Besides, MobaXterm 
software is used in this experiment to take control of the 
raspberry pi board through the serial line. With it, we can 
access the U-Boot without physically connecting additional 
peripheral screen or keyboard. We connected the raspberry pi 
using the general purpose input/output (GPIO) to the 
computer through the serial port and the configuration for the 
serial port is shown as below:   
 
 Baud rate : 115200 
 Parity  : none 
 Bits  : 8 
 
The objective of this experiment is to observe the time 
taken to compute modular exponentiation 𝑔𝑎  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
between the lower bound and upper bound of value 𝑎 by using 
different frequency (e.g. 100MHz and 700 MHz). The 
frequency of the raspberry pi can be modified in the config.txt 
[7] as shown in Figure 1. This computation will be using same 
value of 𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔 but different value of 𝑎 for one thousand 
iterations. While, the value of 𝑎 will be incremented from the 
lower bound by ten thousand for one thousand times. The 
tabulation of data will be explained in the next section. 
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Figure 1: Config.txt 
 
V. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section analyze the results of the experiment that 
conducted by using Raspberry Pi. The results have been taken 
for one thousand iterations of modular exponential 
(𝑔𝑎 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) computations by using two different key lengths 
and frequencies. The value of 𝑝 and 𝑔 are same for the whole 
experiment, while the random value of 𝑎 is different as it is 












Figure 5: 100 MHz (1024 bit) 
 
Figure 2 and 3 show the time taken for 2048-bit running in 
700 MHz and 100 MHz raspberry pi operating frequency 
respectively. While Figure 4 and 5 show the time taken for 
1024-bit running in 700 MHz and 100 MHz raspberry pi 
operating frequency respectively. For 2048-bit keys, the 
timing pattern remains the same even though the frequency is 
changed. Similarly, the same is observed for the 1024-bit 
keys. The difference in frequency is used to analyse the effect 
of the computational time of the modular exponentiation. 
Undoubtedly, we can identify the key length based on the 
patterns even when the frequency has changed. The most 
unexpected finding is the results for each key length have the 




In this paper, we present our observations on the timing 
data relating to the computation of modular exponential 
expression. The results obtained showed that different key 
length exhibit similar timing patterns when computing the 
modular exponentiation ( ) even though the frequency is 
changed. We believe the findings will help us to devise a 
timing attack to uncover the secret parameters by reducing 
the area of key-search. We have considered to implement this 
attack on embedded devices (e.g. raspberry pi) as more and 
more embedded devices are running cryptographic 
applications and are more susceptible to timing attacks. In the 
next stage of our study, we will expand our experiment to 
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